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domicile) were without jurisdiction to grant guardianship over the
person of an infant who survived the death of his father in whose
custody he had been given by a decree of divorce. Here it appeared
that the infant's mother was at the time a resident of Texas, and
the domicile of the infant became, on the death of his father,
identified with the domicile of his mother.3 4 In neither of these
cases was there a remarriage of the widow, as in the ziady case.
They are, therefore, seemingly reconcilable with the Lamar decision.
One Texas case, however, involved the problem of such a remarriage.35 The Texas Supreme Court decided that a widow does not
lose the power to change the domicile of her children simply by
remarrying. 6 That case is not directly in point with the present
case because there was no divorce involved, but it is difficult to
see how that would alter the result, at least as it affects the child's
domicile.
It may be questioned whether the court in ziady was forced
to make the sweeping declaration that in determining diversity of
citizenship the issue of domicile is a matter for federal common
law. Nevertheless it would seemingly be desirable to have one
rule, or one set of rules, to determine the jurisdiction of all federal
courts in such cases. What form these might take is of course
conjectural, and knowledge of this must await the cases which
will create such rules.
William A Tantlinger
James M. Brown
Landlord and Tenant-Constitutional LawRetaliatory Evictions
In March 1965, Mrs. Edwards rented housing property from
Nathan Habib on a monthly basis. Shortly thereafter, she complained to the Department of Licenses and Inspections of certain
violations of the sanitary code which her landlord had failed to
alleviate. During the subsequent inspection, forty violations were discovered, and Habib was ordered to correct them. Habib then gave
Mrs. Edwards the necessary 30-day statutory notice to vacate and
when she refused, he instituted action and obtained a default
judgment for possession of the premises. The tenant moved to re34In re Guardianship of Skinner,
5
3 Wheeler v. Hollis, 19 Tex. 522

230 Iowa 1016, 300 N.W. 1 (1941).
(1857).

361d.
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open the judgment alleging excusable neglect for the default and
raising the defense that the notice to quit was given in retaliation
for her complaint to the housing authorities. The Court of General
Sessions set aside the default judgment and concluded that a
retaliatory motive, if proved, would constitute a defense. However,
the trial court found such a retaliatory motive irrelevant and directed
a verdict for the landlord. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals
affirmed, and Mrs. Edwards appealed to the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Held, reversed.'
Where a state court, in accordance with its law, enforces the right
of a landlord to evict a tenant, such enforcement is "state action"
which must not enfringe upon the tenant's right to seek redress for
his grievances. Consequently, although a landlord may evict for
any legal reason, or for no reason at all, he may not evict in retaliation to a tenant's report of housing code violations. Edwards v.
Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
Traditionally, a landlord, whether public or private, could evict
a tenant arbitrarily-for any reason or for no reason at all. In
United States v. Blumenthal' it was held that the United States
government, while acting in a proprietary rather than a governmental
capacity, has the same absolute right as any other landlord to
terminate a tenancy from month-to-month and recover possession of
the leased premises without being required to give any reason for
its action. The fact that the landlord did not evict other tenants
holding similar property was immaterial.'
With the increase in urban population, the landlord's bargaining
power has been strengthened considerably-if tenants are to rent at
all, they are often forced to rent substandard housing.4 Thus, public
policy has demanded that sanitation and safety standards be enacted
1 Wright J.,
in the majority opinion, discussed the constitutional relevance
of this case (which shall be the only consideration of this comment) in
parts I and II of the decision, but ultimately decided the case on statutory
construction: "The notion that the effectiveness of remedial legislation will
be inhibited if those reporting violations of it can legally be intimidated is
so fundamental that a presumption against the legality of such intimidation
can be inferred as inherent in the legislation even if it not expressed in the
statute itself." Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The
dissent in the case suggested that the prohibition of retaliatory evictions was
a subject of Congressional legislation, not court action.
2United States v. Blumenthal, 315 F.2d 351 (3rd Cir. 1963).
3 Id. at 353.
4 Note, Landlord and Tenant-Retaliatory Evictions, 3 HARV. Civ. LIB.CIrv. RIGHTS L. REv. 193, 205 (196).
' Washington, D. C., Housing Regulations § 2101 (1955); D.C. CODE
§ 5-701 (1967).
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to protect the welfare of the tenants in crowded urban areas.s
The housing regulations in the instant case were promulgated by the
District Commissioners in recognition of the fact that unsafe and
unsanitary housing conditions are "deterious to the health, safety,
welfare and morals of the community and its inhabitants." In
addition to this, it should be noted that perhaps denying a tenant
the right to inform the government of violations of these standards
may be a denial of his first amendment right to petition the government for his grievances.6 One court has prohibited arbitrary evictions
in public housing.7 However, some public authorities have been
restricted by the court only when they give a specific reason for the
eviction.8 To counter this tendency, some housing codes allow
continued occupancy unless violations of specific standards are
shown.9 In Thorpe v. Housing Authority of The City of Durham"

a woman was given notice that her lease had been terminated immediately following her election as president of a tenants' organization. The Supreme Court was not faced with deciding whether such
retaliatory conduct was a violation of her constitutional rights because
the Department of Housing and Urban Development prescribed a
method for public housing evictions in a circular pending the
appeal. The circular requires that public landlords follow a procedure
before evicting a tenant: (1) give tenants reasons for the eviction;
(2) give tenants an opportunity to reply; and (3) keep records of
the reasons for the evictions and of any conferences held with the
evicted tenant."
Retaliatory evictions, which heretofore have been unpermitted in
public housing projects,'" may also be prohibited in the private
sector. To understand this extension of the tenant's protected rights
it is necessary to briefly discuss the concept of "state action" as presented in the Edwards' case." For an eviction to be denied on the
ground that plaintiff was denied her first amendment right.
to report violations of law and to petition the government for
6

Note, Landlord and Tenant-Retaliatory Evictions, 3 HARV. Civ. Lm.L. Rlv. 193, 195 n.9 (196).
7Rudder v. United States, 226 .2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
8
1d.
9 See, e.g., Resolution of Talladega, Alabama, May 29, 1968, in Lewis v.
Housing Authority of Talladega, Alabama, 397 F.2d 178, 180, 181 (5th Cir.
1968).
10 386 US.670 (1967).
IIId.

Civ.

RIGHTS

12Id.

13

Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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redress of grievances . . . she must show that the government

is in some relevant sense responsible for inhibiting her right
to petition for redress of grievances; she must show, in other
words, the requisite "state action."
The "state action" concept traditionally involved an alleged
denial of the fourteenth amendment's "equal protection" guarantees
only where positive action by the state was taken; 4 this concept has
been extended to include under "state action" more neutral conduct."
Also, the "state action" concept may be relevant where the freedoms
of the first amendment are involved.'" (For purposes of this
discussion "state action" shall hereinafter refer only to the neutral
action approach.) The concept has been carried over into areas
that were earlier thought of as solely "individual action."' 7 In
Shelley v. Kraemer,"8 a state court's enforcement of racially restrictive covenants made in agreements between private parties was held
to constitute "state action."' 9 In Reitman v. Mulkey,20 the Supreme
Court held that discrimination in the housing market under a constitutional amendment 2 ' allowing landlords arbitrary discretion in
selecting tenants as a matter of right was "a significant state involvement in private discriminations

stitutional
authority
classes in
Authority

. .

. [that would] amount to uncon-

state action."2 2 It has been held that a public housing
may not discriminate arbitrarily between persons and
leasing its premises.23 Furthermore, in Chicago Housing
v. Blackman,2" the court decided that a public housing

Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
Is Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
16 Marsh v. State of Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
17Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (where a private body is to
perform the governmental function of managing a park); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (private body leasing stateowned property from the government); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963) (privately-owned hospital receiving
federal and state assistance in the planning and financing of construction).
18 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
19 The "state action" concept of Shelley includes the District of Columbia
and every territory of the United States. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31
(1948). However, it has been suggested that perhaps the Shelley doctrine
of "state action" should not be carried over to the District of Columbia,
and further, that the constitutional issue should not have been raised to begin
with. Note, Landlord and Tenant-Retaliatory Evictions, 3 HARV. Civ. Lm.Civ. RIGHS L. REV. 193, 196 n.12 (196).
14Civil

U.S. 369 (1967).
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 26.

20387

21

22 Id. at 375.
23 Housing Authority v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d 883, 279 P.2d 215,
216 (1955).
24 4 1M. 2d 319, 122 N.W.2d 522 (1954).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol71/iss3/25

4

Avis and Cooper: Landlord and Tenant--Constitutional Law--Retaliatory Evictions

1969]

CASE COMMENTS

authority could not discriminate arbitrarily against existing tenants
in their right to continue occupancy. Finally, in Edwards, (employing the constitutional arguments of Judge Wright's opinion,
without having to resort to his discussion of statutory construction)
the prevention of public retaliatory evictions may be extended to the
private sector under the Shelley doctrine. Therefore, the action instituted by the landlord to evict the tenant must not hinder her constitutionally protected right to petition the government for griev25
ances.
Possibly, this decision will seriously hamper the rights of the
landlord in private action. How far it will extend is difficult to
predict. However, under present holdings, the right of the individual
to seek redress for his grievances is a fundamental first amendment
right which outweighs the right of a retaliating landlord to evict
tenants. This decision concerns only one of the many options open
to a property owner. Property may be leased, sold, rented, built
upon, or used for any legal purpose. The holding of this case concerns only rental property; therefore, in reality, the change may not
be as drastic as it may first seem. Notwithstanding the protection
afforded by this case, the landlord may resort to other effective
means of retaliation-the raising of rent or subsequent evictions
of the tenant for trivial violations of skillfully written leases. Nonetheless, the holding in the Edwards' case, at least to some degree,
allows the tenant to strive for better housing conditions without the
fear of eviction for his actions.
Hugh C. Avis
John Watson Coofler

Gift Taxes-Valuation of Right to Income Under §2503(b)
In 1961, Leonard Rosen and his brother Julius created separate
trusts for their children consisting of several thousand shares of
Gulf American common stock. The entire net income of each trust
was payable to the named beneficiary no less frequently than
annually. The corpus of the Leonard Rosen trust was to be distributed to each beneficiary in two payments upon the beneficiaries
reaching the ages of twenty-five and thirty years. The corpus of
the Julius Rosen trust was to be distributed in three installments to
25
Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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